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COMMENT

COMMENTARY TO ANDREAS FISCHERLESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER
THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
INTRODUCTION: FRAGMENTATION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

It will come as a surprise to many readers that Professor Teubner presented their fascinating contribution on regime collision' to the Michigan
Journalof InternationalLaw's Symposium on a panel devoted to "the Role
of the State in International Law." Indeed, one could not imagine better
devil's advocates than Professor Teubner and Dr. Andreas Fischer-Lescano.
They propose a radical break with a concept of international law and order
based on the autonomous will of Nation-States. Accordingly, legal regulation
does not only, if at all, emanate from Nation-States, but from a panoply of
other public and, mostly, private actors. Thus, the authors dismiss
all claims
' 2
of an "organizational or dogmatic unity of international law.
Professor Teubner and Dr. Fischer-Lescano do, however, not only challenge the "Westphalian system, 3 but also the recent advocacy of the Bush
administration in favor of a world of sovereign Nation-States loosely cooperating in "coalitions of the willing." The experience with recent
international rulings may confirm their viewpoint. For example, the Bush
administration was forced to apply the WTO Appellate Body decision declaring U.S. steel tariffs illegal.'
However, such an explanation fails to recognize the element of choice. It
was the United States that imposed the tariffs in the first place, in full
knowledge of their doubtful compatibility with trade rules. It also considerably underestimates the possibility of irrational behavior in spite of the perfect
knowledge of the threat of negative consequences. In any case, it was the
1.
Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collision: The Vain Searchfor
Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999 (2004).
2.
Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, at 1017.
3.
See, e.g., Leo Gross, The Peaceof Westphalia: 1648-1948,42 AM. J, INT'L L. 20 (1948).
4.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks as delivered at the Marshall Center
10th Anniversary in Garmisch, Germany (June 11, 2003) at http://www.defenselink.mil/
speeches/2003/sp2003061 t-secdef0285.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
5.
See United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, Nov. 10, 2003, WTO Doe. WT/DS248/AB/R, WTO Doc.
WT/DS249/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS251/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS252/AB/R, WTO Doe.
WT/DS253/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS254/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS258/AB/R, WTO Doc.
WT/DS259/AB/R, all available at http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop-e/dispu-e/dispustatus_e.htm#2003.
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State which decided not only to accept the obligations in question, but also
whether to implement the international decision or rather suffer the conse6
quences.
Nevertheless, the characterization of the present predicament as one of
fragmentation of the public space into different issue areas conforms to the
experience of most international lawyers. The unity of the Nation-State appears increasingly illusory. Legal specialization does not stop at national
borders. Although States are represented in the vast majority of decisionmaking bodies, whether at the WTO or in the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision,' it may be more important whether a State representative regards herself as trade lawyer, environmental lawyer, or human rights lawyer,
than whether she represents the United Kingdom or Morocco. Thus, for
many lawyers, globalization appears indeed characterized by a shift from
territorial borders to functional boundaries.8 Most issue areas 9 such as trade,
environment, or human rights have left territorial boundaries behind and
cannot be dealt with effectively at a national level.
But States continue to be the main unit of legitimacy and of, ideally democratic, debate and decision-making. For this role of the State, no
substitute appears on the horizon. The "democratic deficit" of regional and
international institutions remains unresolved; alternative models of legitimacy-such as pure functionalism and market rationality-are based on a
standard of efficiency which is itself in need of justification. Systems of
rules and norms constructed 'bottom-up,' that is, by a process of self-

6.
This does not imply that such action would be compatible with WTO rules. See Judith
Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416,
416-17 (1996). For a convincing argument against Hippler Bello, see John H. Jackson, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandingson the Nature of Legal Obligation,91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 60 (1997); John H. Jackson, InternationalLaw Status of WTO DisputeSettlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to 'Buy Out'?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (2004). Bello has
modified her view since. See Judith Hippler Bello, Book Review, 95 AM J. INT'L L. 984, 986-87
(2001) (reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OFGAT & THE WTO (2000)); butsee
Warren F Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The EconomicStructure ofRenegotiationandDisputeResolution in the World Trade Organization,31 J. LEGAL STUDS. S 179, S 190 (2002) (endorsing Bello's
earlier viewpoint).
7.
On government networks generally, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); for criticism regarding the lack of democratic accountability of these networks, see
Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens:InternationalLawyers and Globalization,8 EUR. J.
INT'L L.

435 (1997).

8.

NIKLAs LUHMANN, DAs RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr 571 (1995); NiKLAs LUHMANN, DIE
GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFr 158-60 (1997).
9.
For the term, see, e.g., David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 6-10 (2002).

To compare the term "regimes" as used by political scientists, see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural
Causes andRegime Consequences:Regimes as Intervening Variables,in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). However, as Leebron shows, supra at 9, the latter definitions
lie square to legal terminology.

Summer 20041

Comment to Fischer-Lescano& Teubner

1049

ordering of a particular issue area,'0 cannot legitimize outcomes, because
they are self-imposed by the relevant power holders and power brokers-and
thus open to challenges from all those not participating in the process, but
subject to their decisions.
As Daniel Philpott's contribution to this symposium" has demonstrated
anew, the stakes of this debate can hardly be overstated. The religious wars
caused the Western nations to recognize the monopoly of legitimate violence
in the State. After the horrific World Wars and Nazi crimes, international
society extended, to a certain degree, this solution to the international level
by requiring Security Council approval for the use of force by States except
in self-defense. 2 Thus, no less is in question than the idea of the NationState as authoritative, but democratic arbiter of disputes between citizens,
and as a locus of democratic struggle, debate and decision-making about the
"public interest."
Of course, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano do not ignore the problem.
They argue that each sub-system can itself develop the relevant decisionmaking processes in a transparent and democratic fashion. But this proposition pre-supposes an analysis of who is affected by the decisions within an
issue area. Due to the uncertainty and fallibility of all consequential analysis,
however, the effects of decisions in one subsystem on others will also be indeterminate and uncertain. Therefore, the presumption underlying the
general competence of States-namely, that most decisions in the public
sphere affect all citizens and must therefore be legitimized, directly or indirectly, by all of them-is also valid internationally, whether one deals with
human rights, the environment, or trade and development.
Thus, the present contribution suggests that the appeal of Teubner's and
Fischer-Lecano's model is diminished by a certain lack of attention to questions of democratic legitimacy. This argument reproduces, to a certain
extent, the famous Methodenstreit between Niklas Luhmann and Jirgen
Habermas at the international level. 3 Nevertheless, the phenomena described
by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano are real, and reaffirmations of orthodoxy
will be of little help. The following comments suggest that, in spite of an
10.

See Gunther Teubner, GlobalBukowina: Legal Pluralism in World Society, in GLOBAL

LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).

11.

Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedomandthe Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 MICH.

J. INT'L L. 981 (2004).

12.
Of course, recent developments may have unraveled this compact. See Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security CouncilFailed, 82 FOREIGN Ari. 16 (May/June 2003). For arguments against
Glennon's views, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Review Essay: Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 446, 447-48 (2003); Andreas L. Paulus, The War againstIraq and the Futureof InternationalLaw: Hegemony or Pluralism?,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691,716-17 (2004) (containing further
references).
13.
See JORGEN HABERMAS & NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAF-r ODER
SOZIALTECHNOLOGIE: WAS LEISTET DIE SYSTEMFORSCHUNG? (1971).
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ever-growing functional differentiation, issue areas are held together by a
minimum of common values and decision-making procedures" 4 --in other
words, by general international law which bases its legitimacy on decisions
of, ideally democratic, national processes of decision-making.
LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS IN A WORLD OF MULTIPLE REGIMES

A. Pluralismas a Value-The Example of Religion

In a certain way, the approach suggested by Professor Teubner and Dr.
Fischer-Lescano itself requires the recognition of some first principles common to all legal systems, from the application of legal method to the
recognition of a pluralism both of values and issue areas. However, not all
systems lend themselves easily to such recognition of their inherent limits.
The most telling example is religion, and, as Professor Philpott has shown in
his presentation, it was religion which brought about the necessity for a pluralist international system based on territory and the principle of cuius regio,
eius religio.5 The terrorism promulgated by a certain branch of Islamic fundamentalism has recently shown that the universal recognition of religious
pluralism remains precarious even in the contemporary inter-State order.
That may also be a reason why human rights and religion occasionally
have an uneasy relationship.16 For some, human rights consist of almost neutral, substantively empty principles protecting individuals against
interference from the public. In that vein, human rights delineate the public
and private spaces and do not express overarching values. Increasingly, however, human rights seem to fulfill, in the international system, a quasireligious, ideological function, providing values for the international system
and defining limits for legal regulation-a function, of course, which is embraced and not contradicted by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano.' 7 But if each
and every subsystem must observe the values of human rights, equal participation, and even democratic governance, there is not only fragmentation, but
also a considerable amount of "value-glue"-and therefore unity. That is
exactly what international ius cogens is about-and the skepticism expressed
by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano18 contrasts with their optimism regarding
the emergence of similar processes within specific issue areas.' 9 But to the
14.
For a practical example, see Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentationand Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-ConnectedIslands, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903 (2004).
15.
Philpott, supra note 11.
16.
Cf.Philpott, supra note 11.
17.
Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, 1033 passim.
18.
Id.
19.
Of course, this does not imply that ius cogens in its current form can fulfill this function
properly.
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extent human rights are providing those values, they will occasionally conflict with other overarching systems, for example religion.
Of course, this comment does not suggest that religious freedom and
pluralism are necessarily incompatible with each other. The challenge rather
consists in devising a legal order that allows for the expression of different
religions, albeit each of them claims to present a comprehensive system-in
other words, in devising a legal order representing a Rawlsian "overlapping
consensus."20 But religious fundamentalism demonstrates that functional pluralism is itself grounded on values. It thus cannot avoid questions of
legitimacy by pointing to a miraculous "auto-poiesis" of subsystems that
would automatically justify their separate existence. Teubner's and FischerLescano's pluralism must itself rely on the recognition of overarching values
by the participants of the system. In other words, for the avoidance of an allout war between fragments claiming comprehensiveness and sovereignty,
some unitarian principles for the relationship between different subsystems
and issue areas are required. Thus, the discussion cannot be avoided about
what establishes such a consensus-and whose consensus it is anyway.
B. InternationalLaw as Overarching System

This question thus leads us to the role of (international) law in the management of the systems and of their intercourse. One possibility to
conceptualize the role of law-which seems to be espoused by Teubner and
Fischer-Lescano-is to regard law as a meta-phenomenon, as following the
development of the issue areas it applies to. Changes in the structure of other
systems (such as politics or religion) will be reflected in the law applying to
them. 21 On the other hand, however, law itself is a system of its own, containing its own set of assumptions how to generate knowledge and to arrive
at normative conclusions. The inherent characteristics and specificities of
law provide for a minimum of unity and coherence, such as rules on lawmaking, law interpretation, and law enforcement.
As to international law, many observers have doubted its legal character,
from John Austin 22 to contemporaries like now Under-Secretary of State

20.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133 passim (1993). For an extension of the overlapping consensus to the international realm, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

14 (1995);

ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE

GEMEINSCHAFT IM VOLKERRECHT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES VOLKERRECHTS

IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG 157-59 (2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFF]; THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 227 (1989); BRAD ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL
ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1999).

21.

Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1.

22.

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 117-26 (Wilfried E.

Rumble ed., 1995).
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John Bolton. 23 As H.L.A. Hart has put it, international law allegedly misses
"secondary" rules of recognition, change and adjudication.14 Some, such as
Thomas Franck, have recently concluded that international law has now acquired these qualities, only to have second thoughts on matters such as
Kosovo and Iraq.'6 Niklas Luhmann was decidedly more optimistic. Noting
the gap between societal development and its translation into legal form, the
lawyer-turned-sociologist remarked with his characteristic irony: "But naturally, even lawyers have the courage to travel and to thereby step beyond the
area of validity of their legal order.' 27 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano now

seem to recognize a lot of law in separate functional issue areas, but not in
the overarching system. In fact, their claim that law has to follow functional
issue areas seems to care little about the specific characteristics and assumptions of a legal as opposed to a political or social order.
However, if (international) law is supposed to be a system of its own, it
needs to have basic systemic rules in place. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano
appear to believe that these rules are different from system to system, but
they tell us little of how they come about. In fact, in almost all cases cited by
them, whether the Yahoo! case, copyright or patent law, the legal regulations
in question stem from the very State or inter-State bodies which have been
dismissed before as increasingly irrelevant. Thus, a trend from territorial to
functional tasks will be followed by functional rather than territorial conflicts of norms-but this also depends on the norms in question, not only on
the problem to solve. It makes a difference whether one balances international labor law against trade law or national copyright laws against different
national standards for the limitation of freedom of speech.
The parsimonious character of international law makes it quite malleable
for the self-ordering of regimes-within certain limits. International law
grounds its obligations either in consent or in custom-and recognizes certain general principles, either internationally or derived from domestic legal
systems.8 One may dispute
whether such an order fulfills Hart's requirements for a legal system, 29 but it certainly provides
enough leeway for leges
23.
John Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in InternationalAffairs, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2000). For a spirited defense of the legal character of international law, see
d'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?, 79 N.W. U. L. REV. 25 (1985).
HERBERT L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994).
See FRANCK, supra note 20, at 1-6.
For recent discussion, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002); Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The
UnitedNationsAfter Iraq, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003).
27.
LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF', supra note 8, at 573 n. 40 (my translation).
The German original reads: "Aber naturlich haben auch Juristen den Mut zu reisen und dabei den
Geltungsbereich ihrer Rechtsordnung zu oiberschreiten."
28.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 56 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993.
29.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Anthony
24.
25.
26.
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speciales. The main problem does not lie in the international legal requirements for binding norms, but in the limitation of its law-making subjects to
States. However, this problem is not impossible to overcome if one contemplates applying the same criteria-namely, the legally binding nature of
formal commitments and of custom accompanied by a joint conviction regarding their legally binding nature-to the pronouncements of non-State
actors."' However, non-State actors can only bind themselves. As soon as
public interests are at stake, only public decision-making appears legitimate.
Thus, the question of "who decides?" appears everything but "unimportant."3
Teubner and Fischer-Lescano suggest substituting ius cogens by a regime-specific transnational ordre public. They are skeptical, although not
quite hostile, towards recent claims of the "constitutionalization" of an "international community law."32 The present author shares their skepticism if
such constitutionalization attempts to artificially construct hierarchical legal
orders independent of the actual international consensus.33 But as far as ius
cogens is concerned, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano are working with the
same concepts as international lawyers do, in particular human rights and
participation. 4 Different issue-related legal subsystems are far more likely to
refer to general human rights-requirements than to create new ones-the
transnational ordrepublic will thus appear as little more than an implementation of existing ius cogens. But even if such specific ordrepublic rules can
be shown to exist, they do not take away the need for some common minimum standards for any legal subsystem. Some of these rules will be more of
a formal nature-how rules are made and interpreted-others will be substantive, setting material limits to the self-ordering of subsystems.
Ultimately, of course, it is a matter of perspective whether one interprets
the use of norms from other systems as an autonomous incorporation or as
evidence for the existence of one common system.35 Thus, one may understand Teubner's and Fischer-Lescano's presentation not so much as advocacy
of fragmented systems without a minimum of common legal rules, but as an
argument for a greater equilibrium between hierarchical and diverse views of
international law-an argument which finds the enthusiastic support of the
30.
For a discussion of the human rights obligations of corporations, see Steven R. Ratner,
Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
31.
Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism:Alternatives to State-centredConstitutional
Theory? in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 16 (Christian Joerges et al.
eds., 2004).
32.
Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, 1014, 1033.
33.
Cf PAULUS, INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAF', supra note 20, at 285-318.
34.
See, e.g., Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 1.
35.
Cf Andreas L. Paulus, Beyond the Monism-Dualism Debate, Paper presented at the
Seminars on Theoretical Approaches to the Relationship Between International and National Law
(Amsterdam, Jan. 17, 2003). I also thank Dirk Pulkowski for directing my attention to this point.
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present author. On the other hand, however, the increasing recognition of the
same body of non-derogable norms beyond the fall-back rules of international law demonstrates the 'staying power' of an international ius cogens
over and above the ordinary norms of specific legal orders.
C. Collision-Norms and DemocraticLegitimacy
The main problem with the theory of the autopoietic character of the law
of new legal regimes most likely relates to its lack of attention for questions
of legitimacy. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano create the impression that the
stakeholders in each system can perfectly take care of questions of legitimacy themselves. Accordingly, legitimacy itself is a relative concept and
must therefore be dealt with separately in each system. At times, Teubner
and Fischer-Lescano seem to rely on a sort of materialist theory, according
to which the solution follows quasi-automatically from the inherent characteristics of the functionalities involved. But such a claim hides rather than
uncovers the basically political character of the decision: Balancing trade
and animal protection may not always be possible, for example, by upholding both. Imagine you could catch tuna only by killing dolphins. In this case,
compromise is impossible; either tuna or dolphin. Preferring the one to the
other, however, requires a political choice. Such legitimacy can only come
from a process which is considered legitimate by the international community at large. Criteria for legitimate decisions are of a general, not of a
functional nature. Besides, by emphasizing the separate character of functional systems, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano seem to ignore that, in a
globalized world, everything is somehow connected to everything else. As
anyone who has watched TV reports on natural or political crisis can attest,
global communication leads to some global responsibility. Thus, the separate
character of each legal subsystem appears limited. To give an example: In
the Yahoo! case, a French court decided that Yahoo! had to block a racist
webpage as far as it can be seen in France because its display there violates
sect. R.645-2 of the French Criminal Code.36
Should we allow such questions to be decided by the "Web community,"
for instance ICANN, because a regulation by a territorial State alone is not
fully possible and the Internet should be regulated internationally rather than
nationally? Or should we allow the French courts to order Yahoo! to at least
take those steps to block territorial access that appear technically feasible
(which would block access in France to about 90 percent)? The result of the
first solution would be a unified regulation probably in the interest of most
Internet providers and most customers (but certainly not all, in particular
those who favor continental European rather than Anglo-Saxon free speech
36.
On the case see Mathias Reimann, Introduction:The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws
in the Cyberage, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 663-65 (2003) (containing further references).
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standards). In the second case, 100 percent efficiency cannot be reached (if
one does not allow for a complete shutdown of the Internet in France which
no reasonable person would contemplate), but the majority of the French
society which legitimizes the outlawing of neo-Nazi propaganda would win
over the interests of the global Internet community.
However, the solution on the basis of Internet self-ordering appears illegitimate. The eighty-year-old Holocaust victim is affected (and offended) by
neo-Nazi propaganda on right-wing-websites even if she does not use the
Internet, but learns of the contents of the sites in her local newspaper. She is
not represented, however, when the Internet community is allowed to regulate itself. Likewise, everybody, not only the potential Internet users, will be
affected by the success of strategies to improve access to the Internet. This
would require, in turn, that legitimate decisions need to include representatives of society of a whole.
Teubner and Fischer-Lescano tread on thin ice to only take care of the
concerns of the insiders of the system, not of the outsiders. Because decisions made within many systems profoundly influence the fate of those not
within the system, some general system of accountability and legitimacy
seems preferable to functionally fragmented ones. At the very least, functional systems should be built by processes of a general nature-such as
public international law treaties-and not by custom-designed, but not necessarily legitimate special procedures. In other words, the move from
territoriality to functionality should not be accompanied by a move from
democracy to technocracy. This ultimately requires a minimum of public
control over the private exercise of power.
D. Fragmentationand the Role of the Lawyer

Finally, the system advocated by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano also
raises questions with regard to the role of the lawyer. They counsel the lawyer to go beyond colliding state-set norms and thus to use their authority to
devise new, functionally attuned rules.37 However, this transforms the lawyer
from a representative of society to an active rule-maker. It is of course unavoidable that lawyers devise rules in the absence of authoritative
pronouncements by legislatures, in particular in cases of collision of different sets of rules and principles. However, this does not take away the duty of
the lawyer to refer her authority back to the society which has empowered
her under the condition of respect for the law as set by the competent political authorities. In the United States, we see currently a backlash against
judges who openly assume "political" roles at the detriment of the
legislature. As much as one may deplore the slow process of international
37.

Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, at 1017, 1024.
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rule-making by State consensus, there is no doubt that the lawyer is simply
not entitled to ignore the existing norms emanating from democratically
elected national legislatures.
In the end, the lawyer represents not functional systems, but human beings, human beings who are not-or at least should not be-the objects, but
the subjects of the system. Although the human being belongs to several
functional associations, she is a whole, not a functionally disaggregated entity. As such, she needs not only functional systems that serve her specific
needs, but also a comprehensive representation which is able to weigh different interests against each other. Thus, States as representatives of the
public appear not at all redundant. The disaggregated character of power in
the European legal orders may sometimes appear to dissimulate the representative character of the democratic Nation-State, but the discussion of the
democratic deficit of European institutions brings the point home. In the
United States, there may be more space for self-regulation, but only public
authorities are deemed to be entitled to authoritative law-making. The lawyer
is bound to implement the presumed will of her constituents.

CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
LASTING ROLE OF STATES

There is little doubt in the present author's mind that Teubner and
Fischer-Lescano have identified the challenges for international law in the
twenty-first century. Indeed, "uncritically transferring nation-state circumstances to world society" will not help at a time when new international
actors make the old border between States and international society disappear in order to create a profoundly pluralist international community.
Neither, as Professor Teubner has pointed out elsewhere,38 will unlearning
the constitutional experience do. No doubt, networking will play a central
part in any solution to be found. Nevertheless, questions of democratic legitimacy and of a common value-base remain part of the agenda. The
reliance on hierarchies, such as ius cogens or a constitutional reading of the
Charter of the United Nations will not be sufficient and does not provide
solutions in each and every value conflict. If no legal norm is in place, and
no legal principle available, the lawyer cannot simply run away from her job
but must find a solution by balancing both the norms and interests involved.
Where I depart company with Teubner and Fischer-Lescano is their reliance on and trust in apolitical, functionalist solutions to value-conflicts
between different legal orders, and their apparent disregard for questions of
political legitimacy. In a world in which international and regional organiza38.

Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism,supra note 31.
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tions suffer from the (in)famous "democratic deficit," democratic accountability and responsibility is still concentrated in States. Thus, States remain
the main source of legitimacy for political decisions. That is why international law still relies on State consent and inter-State consensus. States also
play a central role in the protection of human rights, in spite of increasing
international supervision.
Law in general, and international law in particular, does not only follow
slavishly the needs of other systems such as religion or cyberspace, but is
based on normative assumptions and values of its own. It is a system of its
own and thus maintains a basic unity. The rules on law-making by State consensus provide, for the time being, for a certain formal unity of international
law. Some of the products of this process, in particular the Charter of the
United Nations and the ius cogens norms of human rights, peace, international criminal justice, and free trade, provide a substantive cohesion of an
otherwise loose system permitting for a lot of derogation from its framework.3 9 As long as there is no world State in place, the analysis of the

breakdown of the State appears overstated-there is no international mechanism, neither globally, nor sectorally, which could substitute the legitimizing
role of the State (system).
Let us make no mistake: Globalization is bringing about important
changes in world governance, with an increasing importance of non-State
actors and more independent international organizations, but also with an
increasing insistence of world civil society on accountability and democracy
of both international and domestic actors. But it appears to be no winning
strategy, I would submit, to advocate changes which would bring about less
accountability and democracy by taking away the instances of representation
of the overall public. As such an institution, the State remains indispensable
not only for regulating parochial local affairs, but also for striving to realize
something akin to the common good, both domestically and, jointly with
others, internationally.
When reading Teubner's and Fischer-Lescano's article more closely, the
critical reader discovers many common threads in the different issue areas,
such as the importance of human rights and of democratic and transparent
decision-making procedures, as well as the recognition of the relativity of
functional borders and hence of the necessity of accommodation. Thus, a
case can be made for an international order based on the rule of law which
does recognize, even celebrate, functional fragmentation, but does not lose
sight of the necessity of a substantive coherence of laws and institutions
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translating requirements of legitimacy into comprehensive legal norms and
principles binding on all.
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